In our previous paper we have briefly sketched the attitudes in the discussion over the Imperial coinage as means of communicating a message by the monarch to his subjects. Now in short I would like to add some points to C. H. V. Sutherland’s argumentation that, I would like to stress it again, seems to me entirely convincing. However it became a cause of at times even radical criticism from B. Levick and A. H. M. Jones whose opinions in general are shared by some others e. g. P. Veyne. Jones is right in assuming that ”Latin legends meant nothing to the eastern half of the Empire” and that ”the educated classes had something better to read than two or three words on a denarius”. This does not change the fact that the Imperial coinage was only


2 Jones, p. 62 f.
one among other means in a propaganda pattern, and, I am sure, not the most important. There were more efficient media. It is impossible to give here a longer list of those at any Princeps’ disposal, as e.g. building and epigraphy\(^3\), monumental painting and statues\(^4\), in a word the Imperial art with its characteristic Kanzleistil\(^5\), next the ritual of Imperial cult, largesses, ludi, secret police and delatores. To tell the truth the latter were perhaps the most effective media in influencing public opinion. "Coins were a vehicle, if a minor one, for official imperial propaganda"\(^6\). Hence it is not surprising that the coinage occupies only about 15% of room in H. Bengston’s excellent paper: Selbstdarstellung und Propaganda Domitians\(^7\). Even this seems to be too much. If only we were able to get other lost sources e.g. panegyrical historiography, court poetry of which only artistically the best pieces survived, then the military orders, the rhetoric of the senatorial and other public meetings etc. Consequently it is seemly to stress here a great value of studies like that by N. Hannestad\(^8\). The author managed to take into account a broad context of data. Even if necessarily superficial in details Hannestad grasped a vast panorama. If we narrow our interest to a singular vehicle, not necessarily coins, the work may lead to doubtful conclusions. As for the upper classes, either Italian or provincial, there were better ways to convey the code, the instructive language of rulers, than coins, e.g. the literature, administrative posts with their official ways of getting information, discreet supervision of the police authorities. The coins were only complementary. I cannot understand B. Levick’s statement about "the actual contempt of the upper classes"\(^9\). Why, it was silver and gold! Besides the upper classes were not semi-gods occupying themselves with sophisticated theoretical studies, but very ordinary men interested in money, personal security, administrative careers or earthly pleasures. Propaganda, including coinage, could not be destined to shape them or to convince, but to supply the loyal citizens with current political language, present political semantics, to inform them of twists and changes in politics, in a word, show a proper direction. I am sure they were awaiting instructions conveyed through any means, in particular under monarchs who were dispersing fear. The aristocracy was loyal if not servile, except very few and

\(^3\) Plin. Pan. 54, 4; ingentes arcus exsussurosque templorum fastigium titulos; ibid., 16, 3: falsae simulacra victoriae; Suet. Dom. V, 1: (on architectural restaurations) omnia (scil. aedificia) sub titulo suo ac sine pristini auctoris memoria etc.; on an intensive building programme of Domitian see: H. Bengston, Die Flavier, München 1979, p. 266 ff., e.g. p. 265: Domitian hat sich in zwiefacher Weise selbst dargestellt... auf den Münzen und in seinen Bauten  


\(^5\) Veyne, p. 566.  


\(^7\) Bengston, p. 263-274.  

\(^8\) N. Hannestad, Roman Art and Imperial Policy, Aarhus 1986.  

\(^9\) Levick, p. 107.
rare instances. It must be well known to B. Levick, the author of a study on Tiberius. The new issues of coins could be additionally helpful in particular for the provincial aristocracy living far apart from the centre of power. Instances of informing the public opinion by way of coins were innumerable e.g. changes in dynastic plans of Augustus or shifts in power in a result of conflicts at the court of Nero. B. Levick herself collected a considerable number of instances like these above, for Julio-Claudians and Vespasian. However they rather amount to singular and immediate interventions by the court, while those quoted from Sutherland’s look to be complex undertakings. B. Levick stressed that the real propaganda is a “systematic scheme, a concerted movement for the propagation of a particular doctrine”. This definition in her opinion is by no means compatible with the Imperial coinage because of many reasons. Some of them have been already mentioned. The next one is ”the sporadic nature” of issues. I am sure that no one in the Empire had ever thought of a total propaganda in a modern sense, known to us since the Crimean War or more properly since the Cuban War of 1898. The Imperial propaganda was not destined for masses all over the Empire and everywhere, as it is in XXth cent. The difference lies in technical possibilities. However not the technique, I think, is here the key point, but the very nature of power struggle, which gives rise to propaganda activities and the political system in the background. If we forget about these two axioms we may come to drawing such a picture of the Roman Imperial House like the following one: ”a family portrait of the XVIIth to XIXth centuries, with wives, family, mansion, park, servants, horses and dogs... a family photograph album”. Or: ”If a modern analogy is to be sought for the varying types and legends of Roman Imperial coins it is... the postage stamps... they mainly reflect the mentality of the post-office officials”. The Imperial coinage should not be isolated from the context of political system. At the very beginning of his study C. H. V. Sutherland very meaningfully put the well-known passage from Cassius Dio LIII, 19, 1ff, on the consequences of political system for historical research. The difficulties that we are facing are essentially by no means different. The opinion suggesting that the term ”propaganda” cannot be

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12 C. H. V. Sutherland, *Coinage in Roman Imperial Policy 31 B.C. — A.D. 68*, London 1951, p. 59 ff. The reader may follow his reconstruction of complex and chronologically extended propaganda activities undertaken by Augustus.

13 Ibid., 153 ff.

14 Levick, p. 109 ff.

15 Ibid., p. 106.

16 Ibid., p. 107.

17 Ibid., p. 108.

18 Jones, p. 63.
applied to the ancient Roman coinage implies that the phenomena of power struggle, political conflicts or political systems of XXth cent. are something different than under the Empire. Going this way further down we have to come to a conclusion that Thucydides’ or Tacitus’ histories are no more than noble monuments of no value for the contemporaries, in a word to a neglect of more general patterns, even if not universal, the essence of every research. The analysis of data proves that the functionaries of propaganda under Augustus, Nero, Domitian, Trajan or Hadrian were very skilful, very professional in a modern sense. Many times in her splendid study J. Toynbee stressed the high professional skills of the anonymous coin designers of Hadrian.19 Answering B. Levick it should be added that even the best propaganda dictionary definitions should not be uncritically followed, I mean that even the best propaganda system had its triumphs and defeats, periods of activity and periods of inertia, well-aimed and successful ideas and ones which were unbelievably imperfect or self-contradictory, ridiculous or even destructive for their authors. Perhaps to the high degree our discussion is a matter of semantics. Levick and Jones cannot tear themselves away from the XXth cent. meaning of the word. In particular B. Levick uses it in a very narrow sense. I personally would apply the term, in the sense I am using it, to e. g. the rivalry between Philip the King of France and Bonifacius VIII, to the pro-crusade agitation on behalf of the Jerusalem Kingdom, to Polish royal election campaigns in XVIIth cent., or even in yet more general sense to the polemics over the fall of Rome in IV-Vth centuries, or to Biblia pauperum with its unified types of Saints.20 I cannot agree too with the argument of ”ancient historians” neglect of coins as evidence and failure to mention them”.21 I think that what was collected by Crawford is astonishingly much.22 To select the most interesting cases from his list, it is the coin with daggers struck by Brutus, explained by Dio, then the fictitious coins of Firmicus as a token of Imperial power in SHA, or finally the IVth cent. treaty ”de rebus bellicos” with its section on coin types. It would be fairly enough as for the ancient histories. This contradicts Jones’ opinion that ”it is... questionable whether the elaborate messages which some numismatists deduce from coin types were intended to be conveyed by them and still more questionable whether they were generally understood.”23 I would like to draw a quotation from Crawford’s paper, p. 55: ”Dio records that after the death of Caligula the senate decreed that all the bronze coinage which bore his image should be melted down”, and a note 63 p. 62 f. by the same author mentioning a coin with facing portraits of Caracalla and Geta, the latter erased.24 The message

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20 For this passage I am indebted to Cracovian medievist L. Rzepka, M.A.
21 Levick, p. 106.
22 Crawford, p. 48 f. and 51 f.
23 Jones, p. 63.
of the Imperial coinage could not be sophisticated at all. Political propaganda
calls to the low intellectual abilities. The instances to illustrate it are
innumerable. They may be drawn from e.g. the wars of the Late Republic, the
Civil War of 68—9, Domitian’s or Commodus’ repertory, the civil war of
194—7 and other periods. The message is often allusive because any informa-
tion under any autocratic system is by nature allusive. If we do not understand
it properly or clearly enough, it is because of lack in historical knowledge.
Finally I must shortly answer to perhaps the most unjust argument directed
against C. H. V. Sutherland: ”This view of Roman coinage was influenced by
contemporary events... in particular when totalitarian governments had begun
to exploit... media to the utmost in their own interest” 25. It is double-edged
argument. In the same way as one can detect shaping influence of totalitarian
system on the way of interpreting the Imperial coinage, one can equally come
to a conclusion that a historian from EEC country is unable to imagine
a different world than its own democratic and cosmopolitan state and society,
that this is the actual cause of his inclination to ”publicity” or ”publicize” and
”family photograph album of XIXth cent.”, of her or his inability to
understand irrational aspects of politics, the actual meaning and consequences
of deification of a Roman emperor and the state, mental changes under
despotic systems (so well visible if we compare the confrontation between
Caesar and Pompey with attitudes of the Romans towards republican slogans
in A.D. 68—9, or 96—7) and finally the power of images unimaginable to
Jones 26, unfortunately only too well known to the greater part of the world of
XXth cent. It is still much left to be commented on. This what has been already
said is sufficient enough as for the limits of this paper.

Now we pass on to the war propaganda of Domitian. In spring A.D. 83 he
launched an attack on Chatti (Front. strat. 1, 1, 8). The course of events is
almost unknown. It looks that expedition ended in autumn the same year it
started. Since the late A.D. 83 on the Roman mint went on striking obverses
with Domitian’s new honorific title: GERMANICVS (Nos. 2—5) 27. In the
triunphal air of this autumn Domitian received further extraordinary honours
from the Senate 28. In A.D. 85 a series of issues 29, among them in particular

25 Levick, p. 104.
26 Jones, p. 63: We have grown unaccustomed to visual symbolism and find it difficult to
interpret.
27 Bengston, p. 265, following H. Mattingly and E. Sydenham, suggests the date of
A.D. 84 for the emission of the first coins related to the war; R. Wolters, Tam du Germania
vincitur. Römische Germanen siege und Germanensieg-Propaganda bis zum Ende des 1 Jahrhunderts
n. Chr., Kleine Hefte der Münzsammlung an der Ruhr-Universität Bochum 10/11, Bochum 1989,
p. 58, does not state it clearly; I. Corradice, Coinage and Finances in the Reign of Domitian A.D.
81—96, Oxford 1983, dates the introduction of the title Germanicus into the coinage on late A.D.
83, p. 142 f.
28 Wolters, p. 58.
29 e.g. Victory with DE GER (manis) on shield BMC II, 295; GERMANIA CAPTA with
warrior standing and woman seated, ibid., 325; Domitian with Rhenus at his feet, ibid., 298;
Domitian and German kneeling, ibid., 337; Wolters, fig. 29—37.

4 Prace archeologiczne zeszyt 54
GERMANIA CAPTA type, marked the end of the war and incorporation of Germany 30. The main German types had been struck ceaselessly until A.D. 89, the year of the famous double triumph celebrated with great pomp 31. I would like only briefly refer to other aspects of Domitian’s German war propaganda. The first is the Flavian dynastic myth originating from the victorious war against Jews, which in a sense became an act of legitimacy of the Flavians. Thus within the ideological sphere we are bound to parallel GERMANIA CAPTA with IVDEA CAPTA of Vespasian and Titus. That was not obscure to Domitian’s contemporaries at all: frater Idumeos meruit cum patre triumphos; quae datur ex Chattis laurea, tota tua est 32. The cult of Minerva is the next element in his propaganda pattern, that should not be ignored within the present context. I. Corradice noticed that in the years 85—96 “the silver coinage was almost entirely devoted to Domitian’s patron deity, Minerva” 33 (No. 5). As a matter of fact the aes coinage with Minerva had been struck since the first year of Domitian’s principate. There are four main types and a number of rarer emissions of striking fineness e. g. a bust of the goddess on aureus (BMC II, 45) or a magnificent 8-denarius piece with Minerva seated (BMC II, 85). Besides the coins show us a round (?) shrine (BMC II, 241), or even Domitian himself sacrificing in front of a shrine (BMC II, 332). We are told about other expressions of his devotion, as Quinquatria and a collegium of priests in Albanum 34, a temple to Minerva Chalcidica erected on Campus Martius, his monumental equus on the Roman Forum, so impressively described by Domitian’s panegyrist Statius, where the princeps’ dextra vetat pugnas, laevam Tritonii virgo non gravat 35. The next aspect is Domitian’s presence at battlefield and his military virtues (No. 3). VIRTVTI AVGVSTI types had been issued since A.D. 85 on and in consequence their relation with the German war cannot be denied. The Imperial imagery presents him to be muscular, heroic and victorious. Such is his statue from München, where Princeps appears “in griechischer Nacktheit, mit kräftigem Körperbau,... so abgebildet, wie man sich die griechischen Götter vorstellte, das Antlitz noch sehr jugendlich in vollem Haarschmuck” 36.

32 Mart. II, 2, 5 f.; for the brilliant analysis of this aspect of Domitian’s propaganda see: Wolters, p. 62 ff.
33 Corradice, p. 144.
34 Suet. Dom. IV, 3; XV, 3.
36 Bengston, p. 273; Das Römische Herrscherbild, Die Flavier, herausg. von M. Wegner, Berlin 1966; Statius, Sil. I, 1 f. on monumentalism: Quae superimposito moles geminata colosso stat Latium complexa forum; ibid., 89—90: compared to the monument of J. Caesar: quis rudis usque adeo, qui non, ut viderit ambos, tantum dicit equos quantum distare regentes?
The coinage retains something of the monumentalism of his Imperial sculpture. It can be noticed in the image of Domitian triumphant over Rhine. The coin propaganda frequently stresses his personal courage and leadership on the battlefield. I am touching the point, because his literary portrait sketched after his murder strikingly falls short of the propaganda ideal: τὸ τε σῶμα ἀπονομέω τῶν πυγῶν ὁ μοι (Dio LXVII, 6, 3). The last word used in an apparent contrast with VIRTUS AVG VSTI. We could already realize that his portrait mirrored in the official literature fits perfectly in with the state's propaganda. Never failing Statius wrote an epic poem "de bello Germanico" of which only a piece survived. The story of Domitian that originated in anti-caesarian circles is at the extremity. His campaigns against Chatti and Dacians met ironical comments in Tacitus' Agricola: desus suis nuper falsum e Germania triumphum, emptis per commercia habitus et crines in captivorum speciem formarentur. A similar description refers to the Dacian triumph in Dio's history (LXVII, 7, 4). In opinion of Dio, the man who was himself brought up in an atmosphere of omnipresent Severian propaganda fiction, all those wars and victories, not excluding that against Chatti, had little to do with reality. According to him it was all done either for edifying effect (e.g. the forged letter of Decebalus, the war without the enemy or was caused by the fear of his subjects (the titles of honour conferred on the princeps). Even Suetonius, who takes more moderate attitude, does not change a general picture of crushing blows falling upon the Roman army. Plinius the Younger whose brilliant career under Domitian has been so vividly painted by H. Bengston (e.g. in A.D. 96 he hold a confidential post of praefectus aerarii militaris), proved to be more malicious and unjust than others. All that does not mean that Domitian's propaganda was ineffective. In fact he was popular among the people of Rome and the military. Besides

37 Wolters, Fig. 35.
38 Domitian on horseback prancing over a fallen German, BMC II, 339; with kneeling German, ibid., 379; compare Statius, Sil. I. 6 f.: qualem (sicl. Domitianum) modo frena tenentem Rhenus et attoniti vidit domus ardua Daci; ibid., 79—81: tu bella Iovis, tu proelia Rheni, tu civile nefas, tu tardum in foedera montes longo Marte domas.
39 Suet. Dom. XVIII: acie hebetiore... postea calvito quoque deformis et obtusitate venturis et crurum gracilitate quae tamen ei valitudine longa remacuerunt.
41 Dio LXVII, 7, 3—4.
42 Ibid., 4, 2.
43 Ibid., 10, 3.
44 Suet. Dom. VI, 2; compare Dio LXVII, 6, 3 about the military equipment and standard after Fuscus found by Trajan.
45 Pan. 11, 4: imperator, cuius pulsi fugatique non aliud maius habebatur indicium, quam si triumpharet; ibid., 16, 3; compare Tac. Ger. 37: proximis temporibus triumphati magis quam victi sunt (i.e. Germans).
46 Bengston, p. 270.
as it was rightly pointed out by Bengston, Domitian’s propaganda “dürfte nicht wenige Menschen beeindruckt haben, vor allem jene, die sich über die Geographie... nicht im klaren waren”⁴⁷. On the other hand the historians were not alone in their judgements. Some anonymous hand satiated with Domitian’s fever of building triumphal monuments wrote on one of them: Arci (άρκει) (Suet. Dom. XIII, 2). Naturally there is some third truth between the extremities of the sources, however the evaluation of Domitian’s achievement, the actual results of the German wars or his in fact non-intervention German policy, which did not differ essentially from his predecessors’, lies beyond limits of this paper⁴⁸.

The victory propaganda on behalf of L. Verus took roughly the same shape as Domitian’s though the situations were in many respects not analogous. As a commander in the Parthian war Verus got the titles of Armeniacus and Parthicus struck on the coins (Nos. 7, 8)⁴⁹. A special issue of ”Parthia capta” type (No. 8) commemorated his triumphal celebrations in Rome, October A.D. 166. It is very likely that a triumphal arch was either erected on this occasion⁵⁰. In a literary mirror he appears to be a perverted individual (SHA, Ver. IV), greedy for titulature, of no military talents, living in luxury far apart from battlefields (SHA, Ver. VIII, 1). That were to be Marcus himself from Rome (Marc. Phil. XX, 2) and his generals in the East who carried out the military operations (Ver. VIII, 1). The author of HA with a grimace of irony noted: bellum non Parthicum sed histrionicum confecisse (Ver. VII, 6). It should be added that even the fell disease which raged since A.D. 165 in the camps and in consequence compelled A. Cassius to retreat, that spread over the Eastern provinces and even reached Rome before L. Verus’ return from the East, was not able to disturb the triumphal air of the state’s propaganda reflected on the coinage of A.D. 166 (Nos. 7, 8).

Turning to the second section of this paper, i. e. propaganda connected with the anti-caesarian opposition and civil wars, it must be stressed that here the evidence is frequently indirect. The reason is clear. Every autocracy in its struggle against political opposition, on the information level, prefers far reaching secrecy. When feels compelled to say something, there may be only allusive, generalized or anonymous comment, avoiding names, lacking factual value. All that was clear to Cassius Dio who said of Domitian that: ἡνα μηδείμα μνήμη τῶν θανατουμένων ὑπολειψθη ἐκώλυσε σφας (i. e. conspirators) ἐς τὰ υπομνήματα ἔγραφηναι (LXVII, 11, 3). Domitian faced opposition originating from different social groups. He inherited of his predecessors a conflict with aristocratic, senatorial circles having been under influences of

⁴⁷ libid., p. 265 ff.
⁴⁸ Charlesworth, p. 33; R. Syme, CAH XI, p. 180 ff.; Wolters, p. 64 ff.
⁵⁰ Hannestad, p. 219 on the relief of L. Verus from Palazzo Torlonia.
stoical teaching, while on the other side of the social spectrum with poor wandering cynical philosophers. One of them, Dio of Prusa, openly called for overthrowing the tyrant.51 Besides Domitian had a clash with the military while having faced the most dangerous challenge to his rule, namely the rebellion of A. Saturninus in winter A.D. 88/9.52 The Christian tradition too shares in the list with its own martyrs.53 Domitian obsessed with fear of conspiracy reacted with investigations through tortures (Suet. Dom. X, 5), with political trials ended with banishments, confiscations and death sentences.54 Those trials were once aptly commented upon by a German historian of Domitian: Insbesondere in Majestätssachen wird das senatorische Gericht derart Beeinflusst dass seine Erkennisse Justizmorden gleichkommen.55 Our sources handed down a number of names. Nevertheless frequently they use generalizing phraseology e. g. plerique partis adversae in the context of the rebellion of Saturninus, molitores rerum novarum or those who ambitiosa morte inclaraverunt.56 The historical tradition for that period is itself ambiguous and problematic. We have already mentioned breath taking cursus honorum of Plinius, or panegyrics by Statius or Martial. Tacitus himself, as it looks, hold the title of consul suffectus in A.D. 96, i. e. during the years of great terror. In this way we have again returned to the problem of relations between Princeps and intellectuals. Domitian has been portrayed by some of them as a connoisseur and a patron of artists.58 In this context I would like to return to Hadrian and add one more point to the discussion from Part I of this paper, concerning the Jewish war superficially and euphemistically touched upon by Pausanias on the one hand, and commented by Dio Cassius with dramatic details included on the other. Fronto compared that war to Allia or Carrhae reminding of its terrible loss of life. Besides it is not without meaning that the war left impression on human psyche in nightmares.59 In short words Hadrian cannot be presented in either purely white or dark black colours. However in the above case it is evident that that politician of great abilities, there in Palestine.

52 Wolters, p. 66.
53 Bengston, p. 236 ff. on a problematic case of Flavius Clemens and Domitilla.
54 Suet. Dom. X, I—5; Tac. Agric. 45.
56 Suet. Dom. X, 5; X, 2; Agric. 42, 5.
57 Petersmann, p. 1805.
58 Suetius, Sil. III, 5, 280 ff.; i, 1, 100 ff.; Suet. Dom. IV, 3; this idea was exploited by coin designers, BMC II, 318: a bust of Apollo with long flowing hair and testudo (lyre) on the revers.
59 Pausanias, Descr. 1, 5, 5; Dio Cassius L.XIX, 12, 1: πόλεμος οὗτος μικρός συντελεσθερόνιος ἐκτιθη; Fronto, De Bello Parthico, 2: quantum militiae... caesum; Artemidorus, Onirocritica IV, 24: ἐπὶ τῇ μαχαίρᾳ αὐτοῦ γεγράφθαι... ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ Ἰουδαίως, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Κυρηναίους.
became the actual instigator of the war, then he conducted it in a way showing his cruelty and vindictiveness.

Returning to conspiracies it is tempting to draw parallels between FORTVNAE AVGVSTI type (No. 2) and otherwise unknown conspiracy of A.D. 87. It seems either equally promising to arrange along one line VIRTVTI AVGVSTI type (No. 3) with Domitian’s personal engagement in quelling of the revolt of 88/9. Unfortunately FORTVNAE and VIRTVTTI AVGVSTI types had been struck under Domitian ceaselessly year by year. If there is anything connected with periods of instability, that might be PAX AVGVSTI meaningfully issued only between A.D. 85—86, or IOVI VICTORI suspiciously connected with the years 88—90, namely the German rebellion with the following repressions and the great terror after A.D. 94, but not IOVI CONSERVATORI (No. 4) struck regularly between A.D. 81—85. Besides FIDEI PVBLICAe type on aes, “to the loyalty of the citizens”, strikingly coincides with the years of German and Dacian wars, military setbacks, legionary rebellion and anti-caesarian conspiracies (A.D. 85—89). In a word direct references to conspiracies on coins in some cases cannot be denied.

At the period of crisis following the overthrow of Domitian, Nerva recalled republican liberation phraseology: LIBERTAS or LIBERTAS PVBLICA (No. 6). The numismatic evidence fits in with a complex schema of activities which included a dedication of a temple LIBERTATI RESTITVTAE. His political language left trace in contemporary literary phraseology. I think it is seemingly

60 Charlesworth, p. 25: „ob detecta scelera nefariourum” on the inscription, CIL VI, p. 515.
61 PACI AVGVSTI, BMC II, 328; image of Pax, ibid., 329;
62 Ibid., 439—42; 474.
63 Ibid., e. g. 306, 348, 381, 398, 411.
64 H. Zehacker, Tensions et contradictions dans l’empire au Ier siècle. Les témoignages numismatiques, e. g. 333: Le référence à la conspiration de Pison est évidente sur les aurei et derniers Jupiter Custos... émis au même moment (RIC 52—53). Après la discouerette de la conspiration, Néron fit distribuer 2000 sesterces par tête aux prétoiriens; l’émission Jupiter Custos a dû servir à couvrir ces largesses (Tac. Ann. XV, 72); for the history of conspiracies see: G. Boissier, L’opposition sous les césars, Paris 1900 (only to Juvenal); Jupiter Custos on Domitian’s sestertius, BMC II, 373 and a temple dedicated by him to Jupiter Custos, Bengston, p. 268.
in this point to draw a quotation from a study by A. Merlin: Au 1er siècle de l'Empire, chaque fois qu'on fut délivré d'un tyran usant du pouvoir selon les caprices de sa fantaisie, on célébra la réapparition de la liberté et la numismatique enregistra les serments des nouveaux maîtres, promettant l'ouverture d'une ère heureuse. That happened after the fall of Caligula, Claudius, nevertheless proved to be actually popular only during the civil war of 68—9. Nerva his slogan libertas publica borrowed from the immediate tradition, namely the political language of Galba and Vespasian. After almost 30 years of absence the slogan of political freedom must have sounded loud. The analysis of semantics of the word libertas in Tacitus' shows that in political terms it was the opposite to principatus, or more properly to servitus, i. e. tyranny or despotism. Although Plinius speaks of freedom in his Panegyricus (see above n. 65) simultaneously does not forget to say in his invocation to the new princeps what follows: iubes esse liberos, erimus (Pan. 66, 4). It looks that Nerva's "freedom" marked the beginning of a new ideology of the enlightened despotism of the Antonine monarchy, that originated from the opposition circles as Musonius or Dio of Prusa. A. Stylow too emphasized the aspect of senatorial conservatism embedded in Nerva's liberation phraseology. It was by no means personal, ethical, republican value as once defined by Livy. Nerva himself, no doubt, cherished no illusions, judging by his nomination of the new princeps. His phraseology was then a camouflage employed in order to carry out neccessary reforms and preserve the monarchy integral. Tacitus apparently shared Nerva's opinion when he put Libertas so close to principatus, in addition in such a context that there should be no doubt over the former's meaning (Agric. 3, 1). Meaningful is the behaviour of different social groups in the air of newly revived liberties. Those harmed turned to punishment of Domitian's informers and destroying Imperial images. It looks however that there were not too many of them. Angry soldiers demanded that the conspirators should be executed. Deeply humiliated Nerva conceded. Inertia of the majority of the Roman people spoke for Domitian's actual popularity. If then anyone from

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66 Merlin, p. 21.
67 Ch. Wirszubsüki, Libertas as a political idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate, Cambridge 1968, p. 160 ff.
68 M. Aurelius, Ad Semet ipsum, 1, 14, 2: έλευθερία τον άρχομένου; Wirszubsüki, p. 170.
69 Libertas und Liberalitas. Untersuchungen zur innenpolitischen Propaganda der Römer, München 1972, p. 54.
70 Wirszubsüki, p. 168: (libertas) suis viribus nec ex alieno arbitrio pendet.
71 Plin. Pan. 52, 4 f.: iuvabat illidere solo superbissimos vultus... nemo tam temperans gaudii seraeque laetitiae quin instar utionis videretur cernere lacertos artus, truncata membra, postremo truces horrendasque imagines obiectas excoctasque flammis. This description filled with particular pleasure drawn from destroying Domitian's images contrasts sharply with the author's brilliant career under Domitian, already mentioned above, see: A. Giovannii, Pline et les déléteurs de Domitian, pp. 219—241, [in:] Opposition et résistance a l'empire d'Auguste a Trajan, Fondation Hardt, XXXIII, Genève 1986.
72 R. P. Longden, CAH XI, p. 196.
among the associates of Nerva hoped for reviving the senatorial republic of old he must have quickly realized his mistake. The political dominance of the Senate had come to an end once for all. Leading poets and writers were loyal to the court, if not servile, a well-paid army gave a support to the Emperor, the Roman people awaited social security and games which could be provided only by the princeps. In the course of the century Cassius and Brutus turned into Agricola, Cicero or Bibaculus to Plinius the Younger and Statius, the brave Pompeian armies to loyal Imperial guards.

Passing on to civil wars it is seemly to notice at the beginning that almost every instigator's of a civil war leading slogan is peace and stability. Here we are touching "freudian" aspect of propaganda employed by one who fights his compatriots. He wished to be regarded as a maintainer of peace, pacifier as e. g. Otho (No. 1) or Pupienus (No. 10). In the case of the latter a "national unity" sounds like a piece of black humour.

I would like to end this paper with S. Severus and some aspects of his civil war propaganda. Between the years A.D. 201—210 he ordered to strike a number of issues proclaiming him to be HVNDATOR PACIS. On the denarius No. 9 he is represented with the attributes of peace. His triumphal arch at the feet of Capitol consecrated in that period (A.D. 203) still presents him as a restorer of the republic. This fits in well with his speech said before the Senate, known from Herodian: none will be killed, no property confiscated etc. His reign which would follow the ideal of M. Aurelius was to bring ἁρματην ἐνδαμονίαν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις (Herod. II, 14, 3). Still in the camp on Danube he revealed that οὐχ οὕτω τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀντιποιεσθαί ὡς θέλειν ἐπεξελθεῖν τοιοῦτον βασιλέας (scil. Pertinaci) αἰματί (Herod. II, 9, 10). Herodian gave penetrating analysis of Severus' propaganda. He is at his best when describes his perfidy, vindictiveness and cruelty under the guise of noble motivation. In fact we know that before he called his soldiers to march on Rome he had ensured the support of the legates and managed to draw his

\[73\] Bengston, p. 227: Sie ignorierten die historische Entwicklung... dass die Zeit der Senatsregierung unwiederbringlich zu Ende war, und zwar schon seit den Tagen des Augustus.

\[74\] Tac. Agric. 7; Suet. Otho VIII, 1—2; Sydenham, p. 68; There is a grandiloquence in the assumption PAX ORBI TERRARVM and SECVRITAS P. R. which expresses the hope rather than the realization of the state of affairs under Otho; K. Wellesley, The Long Year A.D. 69, London 1975, pp. 56—89.

\[75\] SHA, Max. et Balb. IX, 2 ff.; urbis Romae pars maxima incenderit, templo foedarentur, omnes plateae crueere polluerentur; Herodian's dramatic report (VIII, 11, 6—7) reminding of a journalist's from a battlefield parallels SHA, Max. et Balb. X, 4—5; W. Ensslin, CAH XII, p. 79 ff.

\[76\] Other coins in the series: a) A.D. 194—5; MARS PACATOR, RIC 45; PACI AVGSTI, RIC 54; SECVRITAS PVBLICA, RIC 56; b) A.D. 196—7: Pax seated, RIC 85; SECVRITAS PVBLICA, RIC 93; MARTI PACIFERO, RIC 113; PACI AETERNAE, RIC 118; c) A.D. 200—201: HVNDATOR PACIS, RIC 160 etc.

\[77\] Hannewald, p. 262—267.

\[78\] Herod. II, 9, 19; similarly: SHA, Sev. XVIII, 4; III, 7; Eutrop. Brev. VIII, 18, 4.
sons from Italy. Herodian arranged his narrative along two different levels of events: the official one expressed in propaganda, in perfect agreement with the coinage and monuments, and the other, what he regarded to be the actual course of events. It was clear to him that in politics the practice, word and motivation need not have been in agreement. ἦσαν δὲ τίνες τῶν πρεσβυτέρων καὶ γνοριζόντων ἀντῶν τὸν τρόπον οὗ προὔλεγον... δι᾽...εἰ... ἂν πολύτροπος... εἶδος... ὑποκίνασθαι τε καὶ προσοπήσασθαι πάν ὅπων ἰκανότατος ἔτι δ’ ἀνύσαι καὶ τὸ χρειῶδες καὶ τὸ λυσιτελές αυτῶ; ὀπερ καὶ ὕστερον δέδεικται (Herod. II, 14, 4). Their fear came true. It must be admitted that his propaganda was successful enough to gain him actual support. Since the very beginning he was determined to remove the rival emperors by force one by one (Dio LXXIV, 15, 1), though cunning enough to do it in alliance with the others or the other. The evidence of atrocities committed by him in civil wars is extensive and full of horrible details. We are told about a destruction of Lugdunum (Herod. III, 7, 7), a massacre of Niger’s and Albinus’ supporters, about horrible loss of life in the battle of Ipsus (Dio LXXV, 8, 1), acts of blind savagery (SHA, Sev. X, 1), desperate defence of Byzantium, which became a clear message given to next generations who was actually Severus. Even Dio, cautious as he is in commenting on the Severians, finds no word of excuse for the destruction of Byzantium and expresses a kind of admiration for its defenders (LXXV, 12, 6). He emphasized the strategic importance of the town and by doing this implicit Severus’ blind vindictiveness (LXXV, 14, 4). That savage and thoughtless act must have produced bad consequences for the defense system of the Empire in the long run. The civil wars did not come to an end on battlefields. They were followed by suppression of either real or imagined conspirators (SHA, Sev. XVII, 8). Alike Domitian who saw conspiracies everywhere around Severus "proceeded to carry on systematic persecution of his political enemies, which was continued all over the Empire for the years". The author of HA compiled a long list of the victims from aristocratic circles murdered "sine causae dictione" (Sev. XIII). The suppression was not only directed against the nobles: multos praeterea obscuri loci homines interemit (SHA, Sev. XIV, 1). No wonder that Cassius Dio recounted "the end of civil wars in a tone of profound bitterness". By a popular opinion Severus was nicknamed "Punic Sulla", his perfidy and cruelty attributed to his Semitic origine. A political joke in his time could lead to serious consequences: Damnabatur autem plerique, cur iocati essent, alii cur tacuisserint, alii cur... dixissent ut ecce imperator vere

80 Herod. II, 9, 11; SHA, Sev. XIII, 8: horum igitur tantorum ac tam inlustrium virorum... interfector ab Afris ut deus habitur.
81 Herod. III, 4, 7; III, 8, 2; SHA, Sev. IX, 3 ff.; X, 1.
82 S. N. Miller, CAH, XII, p. 24.
84 Miller, p. 24.
nominis sui... vere Severus” (SHA, Sev. XIV, 12). This is the reflection of Fundator Pacis in the curved mirror of anonymous public. Hope that the above selected examples with very much limited commentary may help to illustrate my point of view in the introductory discussion and by the way present the valuable, even if little, so far unknown collection of A. Czartoryski.

A SHORTENED CATALOGUE OF THE QUOTED COINS FROM THE COLLECTION OF AVGUSTINE CZARTORYSKI

Part II

XI — N — number: the original catalogue number.


2. As, Domitian: Obv. IMP CAES DOMIT AVG GERM COS XIII CENS PERPP, Rev. FORTVNAE AVGVSTI. SC in field. Fortuna holding rudder and cornucopiae; A.D. 87; BMC II, 401; (XI — N — 355).

3. As, Domitian: Obv. (IMP CAES) DOMIT AVG GERM COS XIII CENS PERPP. Rev. VIRTVTI AVGVSTI. SC. Virtus, foot set on globe, holding spear and parazonium; A.D. 88—89; BMC II, 417; (XI — N — 356).

4. As, Domitian: Obv. IMP CAES DOMIT AVG GERM/M COS XI CENS POT PP). Rev. IOVI (CON) SER (VA) T. SC l. and r. Jupiter holding thunderbolt and sceptre; April — Nov. A.D. 85; BMC II, 354; (XI — N — 357).


7. Dupondius, L. Verus: Obv. L VERVS AVG ARM PARTH MAX. Rev. TRPOT (V) I IMP IIII COS II. SC. l. and r. Victory with shield (VIC PAR) and a branch of palm; A.D. 166; BMC IV, 1315; (XI — N — 404).


10. Sestertius, Pupienus: Obv. IMP CAES M CLOD PIVIENVS AVG. Rev. PAX PVBLICA. SC in exergue. Pax seated on throne holding branch and sceptre; April — July A.D. 238; RIC IV, 22 a; BMC VI, 48—49; (XI — N — 444).